What happened
On 5 November 2026, OpenSSH released Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 to fix a password authentication bypass in sshd. The bug is nicknamed "sshole" and tracked as CVE-2026-123158 (CVSS 3.1 8.1). It affects Linux systems that use musl libc without PAM, the default setup on Alpine Linux.
On those systems, an attacker who can reach the SSH port can log in to an account that has no password by sending a very long password (between 257 and 1024 bytes, according to Alpine). Any password of that length works.
The bug was reported by Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield. OpenSSH says it considers "the root cause of this bug to be outside sshd", in musl, "but it is exploitable via sshd and can be avoided there". Alpine published fixed packages the same day.
How the bypass works
On Linux without PAM, sshd checks a password itself: it hashes what the user typed with crypt() and compares the result with the hash stored in /etc/shadow.
- Accounts with no password store a single
*in/etc/shadow. That is normal for key-only users, and Alpine shipsroot:*in its base image. - musl's
crypt()returns*when the password is longer than 256 bytes, to signal an error. sshdcompares*with*, finds them equal and accepts the login.
One more condition applies. A * field is too short to hold a salt, so sshd borrows the salt of another account. The machine therefore needs at least one other account with a real $5$ or $6$ password hash. One user with a password is enough.
Locked accounts (! in /etc/shadow) are not affected. glibc distributions (Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, RHEL) and logins that go through PAM are not affected either.
The fix makes sshd reject stored password hashes that are too short to be real hashes, instead of trusting musl's *.
Who is exposed
According to Alpine, a system is affected when all of these are true:
- it runs
openssh-server(built without PAM), oropenssh-server-pamwithUsePAM no; PasswordAuthenticationis on, which is the default;- one account has
*as its password field; - another account has a
$5$or$6$hash.
root is usually root:*, but the default PermitRootLogin prohibit-password blocks password logins for it. That does not help if another * account can become root.
That is exactly the case on Alpine's official cloud images (tiny-cloud qcow2, VHD and AMI) from 3.18.11 to 3.24.3: they ship an alpine user with a * password field and passwordless doas. As soon as a $6$ password exists on the machine, an attacker can log in as alpine and become root. Images from 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, 3.24.4 and later include the fix. Images where cloud-init writes PasswordAuthentication no are not affected.
Other * accounts include key-only users created with adduser without a password and directory-service users served through musl-nscd.
The researcher's site also names OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and many Docker images as musl-based builds of OpenSSH. Containers that do not run sshd are not affected. Cycode tested public Docker Hub images that run SSH: most turn password logins off, but "a small number were exposed under their documented setup".
How it was found
The researcher says they built sshd in several ways (glibc, musl, with and without PAM) and ran "like 17,600 weird logins" against them with AI agent swarms: every build agreed on every login, "except musl without pam". Public reproduction labs are listed in the CVE record. No attacks have been reported so far, and the CVE is not in CISA's KEV catalog.
Fixed packages
| Alpine branch | Fixed openssh |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 | 9.0_p1-r6 |
Alpine published fixes all the way back to 3.16, even though 3.21 reached end of support on 1 November 2026. Upstream, the fix is in OpenSSH 10.6p2.
What to do
- Update and restart
sshd. Upgrading the package does not restart the running daemon:apk upgrade -U -a rc-service sshd restart - If you cannot update now, turn password logins off. First check that key login works and keep your current session open:
The last command should printmkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d echo 'PasswordAuthentication no' > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthenticationpasswordauthentication no. On older configs without anIncludeline, set it in/etc/ssh/sshd_configdirectly. - Find exposed accounts:
If the first list is not empty and the second is not empty either, the machine matches the conditions.awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/{print $1}' /etc/shadow - Rebuild container images that install
openssh-server, and redeploy cloud instances built from the affected Alpine images, or update them in place. - Look for past logins. Search
/var/log/messagesforsshdlinesAccepted password foran account that has no password (alpine,rootor a key-only user). Also reviewdoasuse, new users andauthorized_keysfiles. If you cannot rule out such a login, treat the machine as compromised.